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NUMBER I

ELIMINATION OF NON-CONFORMING USES, BUILDINGS,
AND STRUCTURES BY AMORTIZATION-CONCEPT
VERSUS LAW
Joseph A. Katarincic*
INTRODUCTION
A municipality contemplating the adoption of a comprehensive plan
for the control of land use is inevitably faced with the problem of
pre-existing incompatible land uses. Stores and other commercial
enterprises will often be found in the use districts deemed best suited
for residences; a sky-scraper may tower above proposed height limits.
The question that municipal officials must realistically face is what
should be done with the nonconformities. Should the nonconformity
be permitted to continue, or is it more desirable to require transformation and eventual conformity? To permit the nonconformity to
continue may weaken the effectiveness of the plan; to require conformity by termination of the use may well place an intolerable burden on property owners.
One of the frequently espoused theories for the elimination of nonconforming uses in the amortization theory of planning. Stated in its
simplest terms, amortization contemplates the compulsory termination of a non-conformity at the expiration of a specified period of
time, which period is equaled to the useful economic life of the nonconformity.
Since land use planning and particularly zoning necessarily have
a specialized vocabulary, the following terms and their definitions
will help the reader to better understand that which is to follow.
* B.A., Duquesne University; LL.B., University of Pittsburgh; Lecturer In

Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
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NON-CONFORMING USES: A
that is in existence and lawful on
or amendment becomes effective
nevertheless, continues unaffected
ment thereto.1
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building, structure or use of land
the date when a zoning ordinance
prohibiting such use, but which,
by such an ordinance or amend-

CONFORMING USE IN A NON-CONFORMING STRUCTURE: A
use or activity complying with the zoning ordinance or an amendment thereto, but which is conducted in a building or utilizes a structure that, because of some design characteristics, fails to conform to
an ordinance passed after the building or structure has been constructed.
NON-CONFORMING USE IN A CONFORMING BUILDING OR
STRUCTURE: A use or activity which is legal when commenced but
made non-conforming by a subsequently enacted zoning ordinance,
while the building in which the use or activity takes place, or the
structure utilized, conforms to the ordinance. The most obvious example of such a use would be a small scale commercial activity or use
(e.g. a beauty parlor) operating in a private home located in a residential district.
NON-CONFORMING STRUCTURE OF BUILDING: A lawfully
existing structure which becomes non-conforming because of an ordinance enacted subsequent to its erection. The non-conformance
may be attributed to size, nature of construction, location of the
structure or building on the land, or its proximity to another build2
ing or structure.
Non-conforming uses, structures or buildings are considered to be
out of keeping with the desirable land patterns for the community.
Until the present generation, the accepted legal rule was that a use,
building or structure in existence prior to the date on which a zoning
ordinance became effective could not be terminated or altered without compensation. As a corollary to this proposition, it was held by
the courts that a zoning ordinance which did not contain a provision
1. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §148 (2d ed. 1953); Whitpain Towntship v. Bodine, 372 Pa. 509, 94 A.2d 737 (1953); Chayt v. Board of Zoning Appeals
of Baltimore City, 177 Md. 426, 9 A.2d 747 (1939).
2. BASSET, ZONING 105 (5th ed. 1957); United Cerebral Palsy Association
v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 382 Pa. 67, 114 A. 2d 331 (1955). It has been
suggested that these four categories be included within the broader term "nonconformities" thereby avoiding the possible confusion that might result by referring to them simply as non-conforming uses. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNINa OFFICIALS, TEXT OF A MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE 30 (2d ed. 1960).,

ELIMINATION OF NON-CONFORMING USES

19631

preserving non-conforming uses would be unconstitutional.3 In order
to avoid such constitutional attacks, communities invariably recognized the right of the landowner to maintain and continue a nonconforming use. 4
Early zoning ordinances, therefor, allowed for the continuation of
all uses, buildings, and structures in existence as of the effective date
of the ordinance in order to facilitate general acceptance of the need
for comprehensive zoning. 5 There also existed a persistent belief on
the part of community officials and planners that non-conformities
would eventually be eliminated by rigid enforcement of zoning
ordinances. It was only matter of time, however, before it was realized that gradual elimination was little more than a fond hope.
Twenty-five years after the passage of the first zoning ordinance in
the United States, it was said:
There is little indication that non-conforming uses ever
do disappear. The favorable, sometimes monopolistic, position accorded them, together with municipal requirements
that all buildings meet certain standards of fitness, militates
against their elimination. And while there is little statistical
data available, it is generally believed that the original nonconforming uses have not decreased during the past ten or
fifteen years. On the contrary, the opinion prevalent among
those familiar with the situation is that the number of nonconforming uses has been increasing rapidly.6
The persistence of non-conformities has been :recognized by the
courts. In Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, a decision
by the Supreme Court of Maryland, which will be discussed later in
greater detail, the court cogently pointed out that:
Non-conforming uses have not disappeared as hoped
and anticipated because the general regulation of future
uses and changes, with some existing uses uncontrolled,
have put the latter in an intrenched position often with a
value that is great and grows because of the artificial
monopoly given it by the law. Indeed, there is general
3.

Molnar v. George B. Henne & Co., 377 Pa. 571, 105 A.2d 325 (1954).
1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAw §7.07 (1958); Kenney v. Building Commissioner, 315 Mass. 291, N.E. 2d 683 (1943); Edmonds v. County
of Los Angeles, 40 Ca. 2d 642,. 255 P.2d 772 (1953).
5. See Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y. 2d 553, 152 N.E. 2d 42 (1958)
(dissenting opinion).
6. Note, 9 U. of CHI. L. REV. 477, 479 (1942).
4.
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agreement that the fundamental problem facing zoning is
7
the inability to eliminate the non-conforming uses.
As the need for the control of urban land became increasingly important and more readily accepted, municipal officials, planners, and
educators showed strong concern over the undesirable impact on
land use and community planning caused by non-conformities. With
varying degrees of urgency, it was stated that non-conforming uses,
buildings and structures, should be eliminated at the earliest possible
date. As one observer remarked:
One difficulty, and by far the most serious, is the continuation of the non-conforming use without an effective
provision for its elimination. Until some method is devised
to permanently eliminate the non-conforming use from our
8
cities and towns, effective city planning cannot be achieved.
Some of the most vigorous and vociferous opponents of nonconformities are property owners and planners. Non-conformities
may lead to reduced property values, a physical deterioration of
neighborhoods, and a general reduction in the desirability of an entire area as a residential section. Concern is particularly valid where
the non-conformities create air pollution, noise, or hazardous traffic or other adverse conditions obnoxious to the sensibilities of the
residential property owner. Planners and city officials view nonconformities as undermining the community-wide programs for development and renewal. More specifically, municipal officials view
non-conformities as a source of increased financial burden since such
uses demands municipal services not necessitated by adjoining land
uses, and tend to affect the orderly development of the community as
a whole while simultaneously reducing the taxable value of other
property. 9
Four general methods of eliminating non-conformities have been
utilized in the United States:
1. CONDEMNATION: By use of the power of eminent domain, a municipality could condemn land and eliminate the
7. Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 305, 129
A. 2d 363, 365 (1957).
8. HERTZ, Non-conforming uses: Problems and Methods of Elimination, 33
DICTA 93 (1956); for a view of the position taken by a professional planner and
a political scientist towards the need for eliminating non-conformities through
amortization, see BARTHOLOMEW, LAND USE IN AMERICAN CITIES at 140-141
(Harvard University Press, 1955); WEBSTER, URBAN LAND PLANNING AND

MUNICIPAL PUBLIC POLICY 409 (Harper and Brothers 1958).
9. Journal of the Proceedings of City Council, Chicago, Illinois, May 29,

1957.
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non-conformity. In 1947, Michigan enacted legislation permitting local units of government to take land for this
purpose.10
Because of the cost, the condemnation route has been

used infrequently. Also, courts have expressed doubt that
such use of the eminent domain power would constitute a
taking for a "public purpose.""
2. ABANDONMENT: A discontinuation of the use for a
period of time specified in the zoning ordinance constitutes
a permanent forfeiture and relinquishment of the non-conformity. The abandonment concept is followed by a large
majority of the states and has the approval of the courts.12
3.

PROHIBITING OR LIMITING EXTENSIONS AND REPAIRS:

More difficult problems arise when attempts are made to
determine the conditions and circumstances under which a
non-conformity may be repaired. The usual situation finds
the non-conformity destroyed or substantially damaged by
a catastrophe, e.g., a fire or hurricane. Where 50% or more
of a non-conforming building or structure is damaged, repair is generally prohibited. To repair would allow the
non-conformity to continue with renewed vigor.
4.

AMORTIZATION:

Under this method, the owner of a

non-conforming use, structure or building must, within a
stated period of time, be eliminated either by its termination,
removal, or appropriate modification.
Elimination of non-conformities by amortization is the topic of
this work. An effort will be made to examine and categorize stateenabling legislation granting municipalities the power to enact zon-

ing ordinances. In addition an examination and analysis of the contents of zoning in the twenty-five most populous municipalities in
the United States will be attempted in order to determine the extent
to which the amortization theory has been adopted. No study of the
10.

MicH. STAT. ANN. §5.2933(1)

(1958).

11. See White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259,134 A. 409 (1926) ; County of Allegheny
v. Maschuda, 360 U.S. 185 (1959). Several writers have expressed optimism as to
the effectiveness of this approach, and suggest that the financing problem could
be met by assessing each property owner an amount equivalent to the enhanced
value resulting from and elimination of the non-conformity. Fratcher, consttutional Law - Zoning Ordinances Prohibiting Repair of Existing Structures 35
MIcn. L. REV. 642 (1937); Solberg, Rural Zoning in the United States, U.S.
DEPARTMENT Or AGRICULTURE (1956).
12. 2 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1 (1947); Munhall
Borough Council Appeal 175 Pa. Super. 320, 104 A.2d 343 (1954).
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topic -would be complete or worthwhile without examining in, detail
the judicial decisions that have dealt with the constitutionality. of the
theory. Finally, amortization will be evaluated and several conclusions tendered.
ENABLING STATUTES
Usually, a municipality can not enact an ordinance or perform any
municipal service unless authorized to do so by a grant of power from
the state legislature. Any act by a municipality done in the absence of
a grant is ultra-vires. 1 3
Municipal adoption of the amortization theory must be eventually
traced to a state-enabling statute. To fully comprehend what has and
what has not been done by municipalities in this area, and to predict
with some accuracy any future trends, the enabling statutes of each
of the fifty states and Puerto Rico were examined to determine to what
extent they would impede or allow adoption of the amortization theory.
The enabling statutes fall into four general categories:
1. Statutes granting to the local municipality the general power to
enact zoning ordinances, without reference to the power of a- municipality to terminate non-conforming uses, structures, or buildings;
2. Statutes granting the local municipality the power to direct the
involuntary termination of non-conforming uses only;
3. Statutes expressly prohibiting the municipality from enacting
ordinances requiring the involuntary termination of non-conforming
uses, structures, or buildings;
4. Recognition of non-conforming uses, structures, or buildings,
and permitting them to continue indefinitely.
Each of these merit a more detailed examination.
1.

DELEGATION OF GENERAL POWER TO ENACT ZONING ORDINANCES:

Although the enabling statutes of thirty-six states contain a general
grant of power to all or several of the local units of government to
enact. zoning ordinances, they make no reference whatsoever to the
status of non-conforming uses, structures, or buildings. 1 4 A large
13.

Kline v. City of Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949) ; MACDONALD,
CITY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION (5th ed. Crowell Company

AMERICAN

1951).,
14. Alabama, ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 37, §§ 772-785 (1959); Arizona, ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. art 6, §§ 9-461, 9-462 (1956); California, CAL. CODE ANN. tit. 7,
§ 65090-65715 (West 1955); Connecticut, GEN. STAT. OF CONN. §§ 8.1, 8.2 (1958);
Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. -tit. 22, §301 (1953); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
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number of the enabling statutes in this category were modeled
after the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act drafted in 1923 by the
Advisory Committee on Building Codes and Zoning appointed by
Secretary of Commerce Hoover. With zoning advocates largely on the
defensive at that time, it would be difficult to imagine the drafting of
a model enabling act explicitly approving or permitting the adoption
of the amortization theory.
The failure to expressly authorize local adoption of the amortization theory has not been considered a denial of such a power. It is
frequently stated that a general grant of zoning power carries with it
an implied power to provide for amortization. 15 Courts in Lousiana,1 6

Maryland, 17 Florida,18 New York, 1 9 and California, 2 0 approved the
adoption of the amortization theory by municipalities operating under
general enabling statutes and found them both constitutional and
intra-vires.
§§ 176.02, 176.03 (1961); Hawaii, REV. LAWS OF HAWAI ch. 149, §196 (1955);
Idaho, GEN. LAWS OF IDAHO ANN. §31-3801 (1957); Indiana, IND. STAT. ANN.
§§ 53-701 to-794 (Burns 1951); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 414 (1962); Louisiana,
LA. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 4721 (1950); Maine, REv. STAT. OF MAINE ch. 93 § 1 (1954);
Maryland, ANN. CODE OF MD. art. 66B, § 1 (1957); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 5.2934 (Cities and Villages), § 5.2973(1) (townships) (1954); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 462.01 (1961); Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. ch. 64, § 64.010, ch. 89,
§ 89.010 (1959); Montana, REV. CODE OF MONT. ANN. tit. 11, §11-2701 (1957);
Mississippi, MISS. CODE § 3590 (1956); Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 278.250
(1957); Nebraska, REV. STAT. OF NEB. § 19-901 (1962); New Mexico" NEW MEXICO
STAT. § 14-28-9 (1953); New York, N. Y. VILLAGE LAW § 175 (McKinney Book 63,
1951); N. Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney Book 61, 1951); N. Y. GENERAL CITY
LAW § 24 (McKinney Book 20, 1951); North Carolina, GEN. STAT. OF N. C. art.
14, § 160-172 (1951); North Dakota, N. D. CENTURY CODE, tit. 40, § 40-47-01
(1960); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE § 303.02 (Counties); § 713.15 (Municipal Corporations) (Baldwin); Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. § 227.220 (Cities), § 215.220 (Counties)
(1961); Puerto Rico, LAWS OF P. R. ANN. tit. 23, § 9; South Carolina, CODE OF
S. C. ch. 10, § 47-1001 (1962); South Dakota, S. D. CODE § 45.2601; Tennessee,
TENN. CODE ANN. ch. 7, § 13-701 (Municipalities), ch. 4, § 13-401 (Counties)
(1959); Texas, REV. STAT. OF TEXAS art. 1011a, (Vernon 1963); Utah, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 10-9-1 (1962); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. ch. 67, § 3002 (1959);
Washington, REv. CODE OF WASH. § 35.63.080 (1961); West Virginia, WEST VA.
CODE ch. 8, art. 5, § 511 (1961); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ch. 6, § 18-284 (Counties);
WYO. STAT. ch. 5, § 15-620 (Cities and Towns) (1957).
15. Note, Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses, 35 VA. LAW REV. 348 (1949).
16. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929); State v.
McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929).
17. Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d
363 (1957).
18. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950).
19. Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y. 2d 553, 152 N.E. 2d 42 (1958), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1952).
20. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P. 2d 34 (1954).
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2. TERMINATION AUTHORIZED; The enabling statutes of five states,
Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Utah, and Pennsylvania permit all or a
specified class of political subdivisions to enact zoning ordinances
providing for the involuntary termination of non-conforming uses.
The Colorado enabling act 2 1 reads as follows:
The board of County Commissioners in any zoning resolution may provide for the termination of non-conforming
uses, either by specifying the period in which the non-conforming uses shall be required to cease, or by providing a
formula whereby the compulsory termination of a non-conforming use may be so fixed as to allow for the recovery or
amortization of the investment in the non-conformance.
The provisions of the Georgia enabling act 2 2 are identical to those
of Colorado except that the power is granted to all local governing
bodies.
The Kansas enabling act, 2 3 also limited to counties, was amended in
195724 to permit adoption of the amortization theory, and reads as
follows:
The powers of this Act shall not be exercised so as to
deprive the owner of any existing property of its use or maintenance for the purpose to which it is lawfully devoted,
except that reasonable regulations may be adopted for the
gradual elimination of non-conforming uses.
The Pennsylvania 2 5 and Utah 2 6 enabling acts, both of which are
applicable only to counties, contain provisions essentially identical to
that enacted by Colorado.
Where only a county is expressly authorized to adopt the amortization theory, it is of some importance to determine if other local units
of government acting under a general grant of power to enact zoning
ordinances, could adopt the theory.
It is somewhat incongruous that none of these states have had appellate court review of the constitutionality of the amortization theory
even though some level of local government was expressly empowered
to adopt it. However, with the exception of Pennsylvania, none of
21.
22.

COw. REv. STAT. § 106-2-19 (1954).
GA. CODE ANN. tit. 69, § 69-835 (1961).

23.
24.

GEN. STAT. OF KAN. § 19-2906 (1949).
GEN. STAT. OF KAN. § 19-2930 (1949).

25.
26.

PA. STAT. ANN. Ut. 16, § 2033 (1956).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-18 (1953).
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these states have large urban populations, with resultant land use
pressures and rapidly shifting populations, where such an ordinance
might become an indispensable tool of urban planning.2 7
3. PROHIBITING INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION: Six states have
enabling acts that recognize non-conforming uses, structures and
buildings, and explicitly deny the power of a municipality to provide
for their termination.
The Virginia enabling act 28 is typical:
Such ordinance or ordinances shall not prohibit the continuance of the use of any land, building or structure for the
purpose for which such land, building or structure are used
at the time such ordinance or ordinances take effect...
After granting a general power to enact zoning ordinances, the
New Hampshire enacting statute provides: 29
A regulation made under this subdivision shall not apply
to existing structures nor to the existing use of any building
The Oklahoma enabling act 3 0 contains the most stringent prohibition against adoption of the amortization theory:
Saving vested rights
In any instance where it is shown that the application of
the terms of this act or any proposed action hereunder will
be in material conflict with any accrued vested rights so that
it would, if applied to the particular property involved,
result in substantial loss, damage or impairment, such right
shall be preserved, recognized and given effect and may be
protected by any remedy herein provided for.
27. In City of Clairton v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co., 390 Pa. 1,
133 A.2d 542 (1957), The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County held an
ordinance providing for a five-year amortization of certain signboards within the
municipality unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed on procedural
grounds.
28. CODE OF VA. § 15-848 (1950).
29.

NEw HAMP. REV. STAT. § 31:62 (1955).

30. OKL. STAT. ANN. tit 11 § 1433; the Oklahoma legislature seems to have
been influenced by a string of decisions which struck down retroactive zoning
ordinances aimed at non-conforming uses, structures and buildings on the theory
that they constituted a vested right entitled to constitutional protection. Fratcher,
Constitutional Law Zoning Ordinances Prohibiting the Repair of Existing
Structures, 35 MIcH. L. REV. 642 (1937).
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The Rhode Island enabling acts I clearly and emphatically protects
non-conformities by providing that:
Pre-existing uses saved - No Ordinance enacted under
authority of this chapter shall prevent or be construed to
prevent the continuance of the use of any building, or improvement for any purpose to which such building or improvement is lawfully devoted at the time of the enactment of
such an Ordinance.
The Illinois enabling act 3 2 provides broad protection for a nonconformity:
In all ordinances passed under the authority of this article,
due allowance shall be made for existing conditions, the
conservation of property values, the direction of buildings
development to the best advantage of the entire municipality and the uses to which the property is devoted at the
time of the enactment of such an ordinance. The powers
conferred by this article shall not be exercised so as to
deprive the owner of any existing property of its use or
maintenance for the purpose to which it is then lawfully
devoted.
A revised enabling act was adopted in Massachusetts in 195833
containing a surprisingly broad provision:
... a zoning ordinance or by-law or any amendment thereof
shall not apply to existing buildings or structures, nor to
the use of any building or structure, or of land to the
extent to which it is used at the time of the adoption of the
ordinance or by-law or amendment...
In two other states, Tennessee and Texas, the enabling statutes both
contain provisions which deny municipalities the authority to determine particular kinds of non-conformities, though they contain a
34
general grant of power to municipalities to enact zoning ordinances.
35
Tennessee insures that:
No airport zoning regulations adopted under this chapter
shall require the removal, lowering or other change or
alteration of any structure or tree not conforming to the
32.

GEN. LAWS OF R. I. § 45-24-10 (1956).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34 § 3151 (1961).

33.

MAss. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 40 A,

31.

§ 5 (1959).

34. TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-701 (municipalities); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-401
(counties) (1956) REV. STAT. OF TEXAS art. 1011a (Vernon 1963).
35.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 42-412 (1959).

ELIMINATION OF NON-CONFORMING USES

19631

regulations when adopted or amended, or otherwise interfere
with the continuance of any conforming use...
The Texas statute provides: 36
.. this act shall not enable cities and incorporated villages
aforesaid to require the removal or destruction of property,
existing at the time such city or incorporated village shall
take advantage of this act, actually and necessarily used
in public service business.
The impact of these statutory restrictions upon the adoption of the
amortization theory in Texas and Tennessee is not clear. It could be
argued, however, that the enactment of such explicit prohibitions in
cases of airport zoning and public service businesses is to be construed
as an absence of prohibition against, and an approval of the amortization theory in all other zoning cases.
4.

RECOGNMTION

BUILDINGS:

OF

NON-CONFORMING

USES,

STRUCTURES

AND

A fourth category of enabling statutes recognize and

permit the continuation of a non-conforming use, structure or
building, but do not expressly prohibit the local municipality from
providing for their termination. Wisconsin 3 7 and Kentucky 3 s have
enacted such statutes; New Jersey's is typical of this category: 39
Non-conforming buildings and uses; Continuance of
Any non-conforming use or structure existing at the time of
the passage of an ordinance may be continued upon the lot
or in the building so occupied and any such structure may be
restored or repaired in the event of partial destruction
thereof.
Although the effect of an enabling act in determining the validity
of an ordinance adopting the amortization theory will be covered
elsewhere, it is appropriate to say that it does not appear that the
courts have been inclined to view such ordinances as ultra-vires.
Generally, there is a tacit or implied recognition of the power of a
municipality to enact an amortization ordinance as a necessary
corollary to a general grant of power to control land use, height and
bulk. The dispute instead largely centers around constitutionality.
36.

REV. STAT. OF TEXAS art. 1011a (Vernon 1963).

37.

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 62.23 (1961).

38.

KY. REV. STAT. § 100.069 (Baldwin 1963).

39.

N. J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-48 (1937).
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MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
From the enabling statutes reviewed, it appears that there is no
general trend in the state legislatures to expressly authorize adoption
of the amortization theory by municipalities. However, this is not
to suggest that there is no agitation for such legislation, or that municipalities have failed to enact ordinances containing amortization
schemes. In this area, as in many other areas of municipal law, local
governments proceed to exercise powers where the scope of the delegation is not completely clear, and perhaps even doubtful.
In order to secure some insight into the extent to which the
amortization theory has been accepted, and the type of amortization provisions that have been enacted, a review was made of the
zoning ordinances of each of the twenty-five most populous municipalities in the United States. 4 0
The review indicated that ten cities including Baltimore, Boston,
Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Kansas City, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, and Seattle have adopted amortization provisions within
the last fifteen years. Pittsburgh, New York, and Washington, D. C.
have considered but rejected them. New Orleans, a pioneer in this
area, abandoned its amortization scheme in 1948. 4 1 The Cleveland
ordinance was declared unconstitutional in Curtis v. City of Cleveland.42
There are substantial variations in the contents of the ordinances
enacted or considered by the municipalities surveyed. Some include
only particular uses and structures, e.g., junk yards and billboards,
while others extend to non-conforming uses, structures, and buildings. Certain of the ordinances provide a general, fixed period
of amortization, while others fix the period in great detail varying
it according to the use being made of the land, as well as the nature
40. 1) New York, 7,891,957; 2) Chicago, 3,620,962; 3) Philadelphia, 2,071,605;
4) Los Angeles, 1,970,358; 5) Detroit, 1,849,568; 6) Cleveland, 914,808; 7) Baltimore, .859,100;. 8) St. Louis, 856,796; 9) Washington D.C., 802,178; 10) Boston,
801,444; 11) San Francisco, 775,357; 12) Pittsburgh, 676,806; 13) Milwaukee,
637,392; 14) Houston, 596,163; 15) Buffalo, 580,132; 16) New Orleans, 570,445;
17) Minneapolis, 637,392; 18) Cincinnati, 503,998; 19) Seattle, 467,591; 20) Kansas
City, Missouri, 456,622; 21) Newark, 438,776; 22) Dallas, 434,462; 23) Indianapolis,
427,173; 24) Denver, 415,786; 25) San Antonio, 408,442. These figures are based
on the official 1950 census and are contained in DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 80TH
ANNUAL STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

(1959).

41. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929); State v.
MacDonald, 168 La. 172,121 So. 613 (1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929)
approved the theory. Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures,
20 LAw & CON. PROB., 305 (1955).
42. Curtis v. City of Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 295, 130 N.E. 2d 342 (1955).
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and value of any non-conforming buildings or structures that may be
involved.
The ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, makes a clear distinction
among the amortization of a non-conforming use, a conforming structure or building used in a non-conforming manner, and a non-conforming structure or building. As might be expected, a different
period for the amortization of each of the non-conformities is
provided. It reads as follows:
(1) A non-conformining use of land shall not be continued beyond the term ending one (1) year from the effective date of this chapter and the use of land which becomes non-conforming by reason of a subsequent change of
zoning shall also be discontinued within one (1) year of
the effective date of such change, unless in either case, such
land be wholly or partially occupied with a permanent, enclosed building, the design or use of which is non-conforming.
(2) The lawful use of a building or structure, at the
time of the effective date of this chapter, which is designed
for a conforming use but is being used in a non-conforming
manner, may be continued for a period of ten years from the
effective date of this chapter. Within that time it shall be
removed or converted to a conforming use. Any such building or structure, the use of which becomes non-conforming
by reason of a subsequent change in zoning, shall be removed or converted to a conforming use within ten (10)
years from the effective date of such change.
(3) The lawful use of a building or structure, at the
time of the effective date of this chapter, which is designed
for a non-conforming use, shall be permitted to continue
for the usable life of the building or structure which becomes a non-conforming use by reason of a subsequent
change in zoning shall be continued for the usable life of the
building or structure except as provided hereafter.
(4) All signs and billboards non-conforming with the
use provisions of this chapter shall be removed within a
period of five (5) years from the effective date of this chapter, except that non-conforming signs specifically describing the business or nature of a non-conforming building,
structure or use of the same premises may be maintained
43
during the usable life of such building, structure or use.
43.,

KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 65 § 65.230.
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Under subdivision (3) of the Kansas City Ordinance, there is
no amortization of non-conforming buildings or structures since
they can continue for the period of their usable life. Under the
provisions of a conventional ordinance, a non-conforming building
would be subject to the same restriction. Also, it should be noted
that under subdivision (1) a non-conforming use of land may be
terminated in one year, while under subdivision (2) the use if
performed in conjunction with any building or structure can continue for ten years. Since the latter may involve a structure having
little or no value, it would appear that problems may arise in de44
fending the difference between the two amortization periods.
The ordinance does provide for removal of a non-conforming
building or structure in subdivision (2) which becomes such as a
result of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, but fails to establish the requirement of removal in subdivision (3) where conceivably the structure or building could still be standing though
its period of useful life has passed.
The Chicago Ordinance contains the most detailed treatment of
the amortization theory that has been enacted by any municipality
to date. It provides that:
1. A non-conforming use of land shall be terminated
within five (5) years;
2. A non-conforming use in a conforming structure or
building shall be terminated within eight (8) to fifteen (15)
years;
3. Non-conforming buildings and structures
eliminated as follows:

shall be

a. Buildings or structures of a value of less than
$5,000.00
(1) Under $2,000.00-within five (5)
passage of the ordinance;

years after

(2) Over $2,000.00-but under $5,000.00, ten (10)
years after adoption;
44. In City of Seattle v. Martin, 554, Wash. 2d, 663, 342, P.2d 602 (1959)
the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance providing for the involuntary termination
of a non-conforming use of land, not involving any structure, within one year.
In a letter to this writer, dated March 4, 1960, counsel for the appellant - landowner said the following which is applicable to the Kansas City Ordinance:
"If Mr. Martin had had a little old shack on the lot, he probably could

have continued on in business."

196A]

ELIMINATION OP NON-.ON ORMING USES

b. All others, within twenty-five (25) to fifty (50)
45
years depending upon the nature of the construction.
The Chicago Ordinance, like that of Kansas City, is self executing
and provides little area for individual treatment of the various nonconformities. The detailed provisions of the Chicago Ordinance
should prove useful in the event its constitutionality is challenged.
Courts in several cases, which will be analyzed later, have criticized
the amortization theory because of the general application of its
46
provisions.
The Chicago Ordinance stands in contrast to the general provisions
of the zoning ordinance enacted by Seattle, Washington, which reads
as follows:
Termination of certain Non-Conforming uses
Any Non-conforming use not involving a structure or one
involving a structure having assessed value of less than one
hundred dollars ($100) on the effective date of this Ordinance may be continued for no longer than one year after
said date, and any non-conforming use involving a structure
having an assessed value of more than one hundred dollars
($100) but less than three hundred dollars ($300) on the
effective date of this Ordinance may be continued no longer
than two years after said date; provided, however, the above
provisions shall not apply to any non-conforming advertis4
ing sign. 7

Los Angeles adopted the amortization theory in 1946 in a comprehensive zoning ordinance in spite of the sweeping language in Jones
v. City of Los Angeles, where in 1930 the California Supreme Court
said:
Threatened invasion of a residence district by business may
be an impelling reason for affording protection by way of a
zoning ordinance, but such an ordinance may not operate to
remove business found there.4 8 (Emphasis supplied)
45.

CHICAGO, ILL., ZONING ORDINANCE Art. 6. The committee that drafted

and submitted Article 6 to the Chicago City Council said the following:
"It is obviously necessary in the interests of urban conservation and
rehabilitation to provide a mechanism for the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses."
CITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON BUILDINGS AND ZONING, A REPORT ON THE PROPOSED
COMPREHENSIVE AMENDMENT TO THE CHICAGO ZONING ORDINANCE 28 (1955).

46. City of La Mesa v. Tweed and Gambrell Planning Mill 146 Cal. App. 2d
762, 304 P.2d 803 (1956); Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y. 2d 553, 152 N.E.2d
42 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
47.

SEATTLE, WASH., ZONING ORDINANCE §5.33.

48.

211 Cal. 304, 308, 295 P. 14, 18 (1930).
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The Los Angeles amortization provision was the most elaborate and
detailed one in existence at the time of its passage, and eventually
was upheld by the courts in the landmark case of City of Los Angeles
v. Gage.4 9 The Ordinance provides that a non-conforming use of a
conforming building or structure may be continued except that in
residential zones any non-conforming commercial or industrial use
of a residential building or residential accessory building shall be
discontinued within five years. 5 0 The limitation of amortization to
non-conforming uses found only within residential districts constitutes a sounder approach than one requiring elimination from all
districts. It is in such zones that the non-conformity proves most
obnoxious, and it can reduce the usefulness of residential land which
may have high social utility and value. 5 1
The Los Angeles Ordinance also provides that a non-conforming
use of land shall be discontinued within five years after June, 1946,
or within five years from the date the use became non-conforming,
if:
1. No building is employed in conjunction with such use.
2. The only buildings that are employed are necessary to
or incidental to such use.
3. Such use is maintained in connection with a nonconforming building.
Where the non-conforming use of land is accessory or incidental to
the non-conforming use of a non-conforming building, it shall be discontinued on the same date the non-conforming use is discontinued.
The enactment of Denver, Colorado contains a feature that many
feel is essential to effective control of non-conforming uses, buildings
and other structures. 5 2 Under this provision, all non-conformities
must be registered with the Department of Zoning Administration,
thereby giving a central administration officer a complete picture of
the extent of non-conformity throughout the municipality. The
Ordinance provides that non-conforming uses taking place within a
building or structure, containing less than one hundred square feet
of gross floor area, or a junk yard, shall be terminated within three
years. Non-conforming uses in residential districts are given fifteen
years in which to terminate. No provision is made for the termination or elimination of non-conforming buildings or structures.
49.

127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).

50.

Los ANGELES, CAL,, MUNICIPAL CODE § 12.23.

51. Horack, Report of the Eighth Annual Planning Conference of the
American Society of Planning Officials, PLANNING 153 (1952).
52. CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO, REVISED MUNICIPAL CODE OF
THE CITY AND COUNTY § 617.
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A recently enacted ordinance containing an amortization provision
was adopted by San Francisco, California on September 13, 1958. The
ordinance contains detailed and quite specific provisions governing
the amortization periods and administration of the program of
elimination.

53

The San Francisco Ordinance states that:
1. Non-conforming uses, buildings and signs shall be
terminated within five years after the effective date of the
ordinance where,
a. The non-conforming commercial or industrial use
does not involve a building, or
b. The non-conforming building in a residential area
does not have an assessed valuation in excess of $500.
Section 54 of the Ordinance contains a long and complicated preamble suggestive of the language used by the courts in giving judicial sanction to the theory:
The purpose of this section is to provide for the gradual
elimination of conversion after a reasonable allowance of
time for the amortization of investments therein, of certain
classes of non-conforming buildings, in order to encourage
and promote the orderly and beneficial development of land
with non-conforming buildings and uses. This section is
intended to apply to obsolescent buildings whose use is
widely at variance with the regulations of this ordinance,
and is a safeguard against unnecessary hardship in application by a provision for a minimum period of continuance
of twenty (20) years, by procedure for extension and exception, and by the requirement for repeated notice as the buildings approach an age indicative of obsolescence. It is further
declared that the requirement of eventual removal, or conversion to conforming use of such buildings, subject to exceptions set forth, is in the public interest and is intended
to promote the general welfare.
The minimum period for removal or conversion of the non-conforming building is twenty years. Thereafter, depending upon the
nature of construction and type of materials, the buildings must be
removed or converted within periods ranging from thirty to fifty
years. Where special circumstances exist, applying to any one building but not to all in general, which would cause hardship to the
53.

CITY AND

COUNTY

OF SAN

FRANCISCO,

CAL.; ORDINANCE

No.

492-58

§ § 50-56. The entire Ordinance has not as yet been reproduced for public use, but
can be found in the San Francisco News, August 30, 1958, p. A-B.
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owner if removal or conversion was required, annual extensions may
54
be granted under the variance procedures.
Administrative officials are required to identify all non-conformities and to notify the owners of any impending termination.
Additionally, the Planning Commission may under certain conditions permit the following non-conformities to continue indefinitely
as conditional uses:
1. Private residential dwellings;
2.

Commercial or industrial buildings;

3.

Professional offices or stores in certain residential districts.

The San Francisco Ordinance allows for a flexibility not present in
similar enactments, and permits the termination of non-conformities
to be integrated into a general overall scheme of community development by making use of the Planning Commission and the Professional
Zoning Administrator. By allowing exceptions to the absolute application of the theory, the ordinance allows for the retention in
individual cases of those buildings or uses which in fact are beneficial and acceptable to the local economy and the land use pattern
of the zone in which they are located.
Though the constitutionality and general desirability of the amortization theory will be discussed later, it can be said that an ordinance,
like that of San Francisco, providing for an amortization period
which is not a fixed or unchanging period, but is sufficiently broad to
allow adjustments and changes under the circumstances of any par55
ticular case will more probably be upheld.
Boston operates under an ordinance closely patterned after the
one Kansas City, Missouri enacted, and provides for the elimination
of all non-conforming buildings by April 1, 1961, or thirty-seven
56
years after such a building becomes non-conforming.
New York, Pittsburgh, and Washington, D. C. have considered and
57
rejected the amortization theory within the last several years.
These proposed ordinances all reflected the most advanced thinking
54.

CITY AND COUNTY

OF SAN

FRANCISCO,

CAL.,

ORDINANCE

No.

492-58

§ 202.
55.

Note, 2 U.C.L.A. LAW REv. 295 (1955).
56. Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20 LAW &
CON. PROB., 305 (1955).
57.

AMERICAN

INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS,

New York City 33 (1951).

NEW

YORK CHAPTER,

Rezoning
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on the amortization theory.5 8 The proposed Washington, D. C. ordinance provided for four separate classes of non-conformities:
1. Class I applied to non-conforming uses of land which were to
terminate within five years if no structure was involved, or if the
value of any structure connected with the use was less than $1,000.
2. Class II extended to all other uses, including those which provide the greatest risk of deterioration to neighboring property, and
which must terminate within fifteen years.
3. Class M1 encompassed a group of uses which presented the
next most serious threat to surrounding uses, and which must terminate within twenty-five years.
4. Class IV covered all other non-conforming uses, including
apartment houses in commercial districts, all of which could continue indefinitely.
A novel feature of the Washington, D. C. proposal was that the
period of allowable amortization was, to a large extent, to be determined by the deleterious effect on surrounding uses that the particular non-conformity caused. 5 9
The power of Newark, New Jersey, to adopt the amortization
theory is doubtful in light of a provision in the enabling act 6 0 which
provides:
Any non-conforming use or structure existing at the time
of the passage of an ordinance may be continued...
The Zoning Commission of Baltimore, Maryland on February 1,
1960 transmitted an amendment to the zoning ordinance to the Mayor
dealing with non-conforming uses and buildings. Its purpose was to:
58.

FINAL REPORT OF THE

REZONING STUDY, A NEw ZONING PLAN FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 112 (November 9, 1956).

59. This approach to the priority of elimination was apparently first suggested by Attorney Richard F. Babcock at the annual meeting of the American
Society of Planning Officials in 1954, where he indicated that the amortization
period should be based on the municipality's objective in eliminating the nonconformity. PLANNING 158 (1954).
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-48 (1937). In a letter to this writer dated
March 4, 1960, Newark Corporate Counsel Vincent P. Torppey indicated that
this provision in the enabling act would not only prohibit adoption of the amortization theory, but prohibited the enactment of a provision providing that "No
non-conforming use which shall have discontinued for a period of twelve (12)
months shall be resumed...

" NEwARK, NEW JERSEY, ORDINANCE § 36:15. This

position is substantiated by REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON ZONING AND PLANNING,

made to the NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS, 1958, and written
by Fred G. Stickel, Counsel for Roseland, New Jersey.
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1. Provide an effective tool for the regulation and control of nonconformities in order to arrest the spread of blight and the further
deterioration of neighborhoods within the city; and to
2.

Reduce non-conformities as speedily as possible.

The proposal distinguishes among non-conforming uses, structures, and buildings with emphasis on the realization of securing a
compatible land use pattern. The over-emphasis on elimination for
the sake of elimination is avoided, and extensive discretionary powers
are vested in a Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals to relax or
vary the application of the ordinance in certain described situa1
tions. 6
Certain general observations concerning the ordinances reviewed
are possible. It is immediately obvious that those enacted during the
current decade are more elaborate and flexible than the ordinances
first enacted by New Orleans, Louisiana in 1927 and repealed in 1948.
Correspondingly there is a recognition of the need for a professional
public servant to administer and exercise the discretion that flexibility inevitably demands. In addition, flexibility should help to avoid
hardships in individual cases, and should permit the community to
retain those non-conformities that give promise of the greatest
62
amount of social benefit.
But this sophistication may have undesirable ramifications in
another direction. Many small political subdivisions find it difficult,
if not impossible, to obtain and retain competent zoning officers and
officials who can administer such an ordinance. An unwise exercise
of discretion by local officials susceptible to various pressures, political and economic, and not possessing the independence that accompanies professionalism and competence, could do much to impede
public acceptance and legislative adoption of an amortization scheme.

THE AMORTIZATION THEORY IN THE COURTS
From its earliest days the law of zoning has largely developed
around a basic rule of constitutional law which prohibits legislation
retroactively divesting property rights without paying compensation.
Applying this general principle to zoning law, some courts early held
that a use, building or structure, lawful at the time that a zoning
61. ZONING COMMISSION OF BALTIMORE CITY, MARYLAND,
REGULATIONS ON NON CONFORMANCE (January 28, 1960).
62.

RECOMMENDED

Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261 222 N.W. 86 (1928);

1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW & PRACTICE § 159 (1953).
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ordinance or amendment thereto is enacted, may continue indefinitely
as a legally protected non-conformity. Cases so holding have generally proceeded on the theory that once one undertakes a use or
erects a structure or building, he obtains a vested right in its continuation protected in most instances, excepting perhaps where a nuisance
exists, by the law. 6 3
In State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby,6 4 an ordinance enacted
by New Orleans provided that all commercial activities were to be
excluded from a residential zone one year after its enactment. The
defendant landowner had operated a drugstore in the area for many
years and relied on the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution in resisting efforts to discontinue the non-conforming
use. 6 5 The Supreme Court of Louisiana approved termination of the
use and found that the ordinance was not an unreasonable exercise
of the police power. A companion case, State ex rel. Dema Realty Co.
v. McDonald,6 6 involved the same ordinance and approved the termination of a grocery store, a non-conforming use, within one year.
Both the Jacoby and McDonald cases must be read carefully inasmuch
as the language in the opinions indicate that the uses did, in fact,
constitute nuisances which, of course, could always be summarily
terminated without compensation. 6 7 These cases have not been cited
with frequency by individuals favoring the amortization theory. In
referring to the Dema case, for example, one writer has said:
The Louisana decisions in this field . . . sound more like

Cosack interpretations of Muscovite ukases than utterances
of a court operating under the benign provisions of the
68
Magna Carta.
Little was heard of amortization during the depression years
since matters of greater urgency absorbed the nation's attention and
energies. In 1942 an article appeared in the University of Chicago
Law Review discussing in detail the development and then existing
state of the amortization theory. 6 9 The author's conclusion was
prophetic of the tone of later judicial decisions reviewing the constitutionality of amortization when he said:
The advantage of amortization as a method of eliminating
63. Note, 7 STAN. L. REv., 415 (1955).
64. 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
66. 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929) cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929).
67. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
68. Fratcher, Conatitutional Law - Zoning Ordinances Prohibiting Repair
of Existing Structures, 35 MCH. L. REv. 642, 644 (1937).
69. Op. cit. supra, note 6, p.477.
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existing non-conforming uses is that it would allow the
owner of the non-conforming use, by affording him an opportunity to make new plans, at least partially to offset any
loss which he might suffer... If the period is skillfully computed, the loss to the owner will be small when compared
70
with the benefit to the public.
In City of Akron v. Chapman,7 1 the defendant opened a junk yard
in 1916. Under a comprehensive ordinance enacted in 1922 by the
City of Akron, it became non-conforming. The ordinance contained
an unusual provision whereby city council could by separate ordinance
direct the discontinuance of such use after it had been in existence
for a reasonable time. The defendant landowner attacked an ordinance passed in 1950 providing for termination of his use within one
year. The court said that a zoning ordinance may not divest a vested
property right, and held that an ordinance which prohibits the continuation of an existing use of valuable property is unconstitutional.
The court did not discuss or attempt to refute by analysis various
arguments supporting amortization. This decision was criticized in
Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. 7 1 A An attempt has
been made to explain Chapman and minimize its effect on the basis
that the original comprehensive ordinance was indefinite, and that
the one year period of amortization in the 1950 ordinance was too
72

short.

In a corollary to the Chapman case, the Ohio Court of Appeals of
Cuyahoga County in Curtis v. City of Cleveland,7 3 reviewed an
amendment to a zoning ordinance rezoning an area from commercial to residential. The plaintiff landowners had erected a large commercial structure and had made substantial capital investments in
its modification. The court found that the amendment was unconstitutional because by making the structure non-conforming, the
70. Op. cit. supra, note 6, pp.486-487.
71. 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E. 2d 697 (1953).
71A. 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
72. Note, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1283 (1954); It has also been said that the Ohio
Court did not reach the question of whether or not the time limit for termination
was too short, or to state it differently, not long enought, but rather that it was
apparently content to let the matter rest on what the court considered= to be
obvious confiscation. 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, § 159 (2d ed. 1953).
73. 164 Ohio St. 296, 130 N.E.2d 342 (1955); After a series of appeals,
reversals, and remands, the Ohio Courts held that the amendatory ordinances
were confiscatory, unreasonable, and discriminatory, without any relationship

to the furtherance of the health and welfare of the community, and a violation
of due process.
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plaintiff's land was reduced in value and this constituted an unconstitutional taking.
The attitude of the Ohio Courts towards amortization was clearly
shown when the Curtis Case, reached the appellate court, where it
was said:
The fact that owners have substantially improved their
lands for a use, lawful at the time they have so improved
them (whether lawful because of or by reason of the absence
of applicable zoning legislation) is always an important
factor in determining the validity of subsequent zoning legislation providing against such use .

.

. This court has recog-

nized it as so important a factor as to prevent such legislation from being valid if it does not provide for the continuance of a non-conforming use.

. .

although not so important

a factor as to always prevent legislation limiting the extension of such use ... 4
The reasoning of the court in the Curtis case was unusual for, if
anything, the value of the plaintiff's land and structure, by virtue of
the monopolistic position it enjoyed, was in fact increased over
75
that of vacant land in the immediate vicinity.
In Concord Township v. Cornog,7 6 the municipality brought a
bill in equity to require the General Outdoor Advertising Company to
remove free-standing advertising signs from a commercial district.
The local zoning ordinance contained a six month amortization period
for non-conforming signs. In a short opinion based on proceedings
where no testimony was taken or finding of fact made, the Court
of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, held the ordinance unconstitutional and went on to say:
Never in Pennsylvania have owners of land been deprived of
pre-existing non-conforming uses. Indeed a pre-existing nonconforming use in Pennsylvania has always, and we think
properly so, been treated as a vested property right: AppeaZ
of Hailer Baking Co. 295 Pa. 257 . . . I am an individual
considerably more consecrated to the constitutional safeguards of this government than I am a champion of the
aesthetic beauties of this land, and as a lawyer and a judge
I am sworn to preserve and protect the Constitution of the
74.

164 Ohio St. 296, 130 N.E.2d 342 (1955).

75.

This decision is criticized as being unsound. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLAN-

NING OFFICIALS, 8 ZONING DIGEST at 37-39 (February, 1956).

76.

9 D.C.2d 79, 48 MUN. L. REV. 202 (1954).
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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and of the United States of
America. 77
The municipality in Concord contended that the termination of a
non-conforming structure could be compelled if a reasonable time was
allowed to permit the owner to recoup his capital investment. The
court refused to accept this argument, and said:
Just how one is going to recoup his investment under the
circumstances here is not made clear. Certainly the advertising company can within a reasonable period of time recoup
the cost of erecting their signs but the real defendants here
are the owners of land, the ones named defendants originally
by the township. How are they going to recoup the value of
the land which yield them a substantial annual income. The
78
answer is they can't.
The appellate courts of two states have refused to pass on the constitutionality of amortization provisions. They disposed of the cases
in which such provisions were attacked on other grounds. The Court
of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania sitting in equity,
held unconstitutional an amortization scheme requiring the removal
of all free-standing advertising signs within the City of Clairton five
years after the effective date of the ordinance. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, on appeal, in Clairton v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Company,7 9 held that the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance could not be attacked in equity, but that such an attack should
follow the statutory procedure for appeal through the local zoning
board of adjustment. In United Advertising Corp. v. Raritan,8 0 an
ordinance providing a two year amortization period for the elimina77.

9 D.C.2d 79, 87-88, 48 MUN. L. REV. 202, 209-210 (1954).

78. 9 D.C.2d 79, 86-87; 48 MUN. L. REv. 202, 208-209. In Drago v. Norristown Borough Board of Adjustment, 53 D. & C. 380 (Pa. Com. P., 1945) the
defendant operated a junk yard which became a non-conforming use. The applicable zoning ordinance provided that within three years after the passage, a
non-conforming use, upon petition signed by sixty per cent of all property owners
within two hundred feet of such use was to be discontinued upon approval of the
Zoning Board of Adjustment. The Board's action in refusing to direct discontinuance upon petition was affirmed by the court which said that there was no
evidence of a abuse of discretion in the refusal. In dicta, the court said, "While
it is true that appellate courts have become more liberal in upholding the constitutionality of zoning ordinances (see White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259 (1926), and
cases therein cited), yet no case seems to have gone so far as to sustain an
ordinance, in effect legislating out of existence an existing legal business.... The
fact that the present ordinance allows a grace of three years does not affect this
general principle of Law." (Emphasis added) (53 D.&C. at 385)."
79.

390 Pa. 1, 133 A.2d 542 (1958).

80.

11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952).
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tion of general ground advertising signs was held to be outside the
scope of power granted to the municipality by the enabling act, and
hence ultra-vires.
In 1949 Corpus Christi, Texas, amended its zoning ordinance to
thereafter require certain specifically enumerated non-conforming
uses to be discontinued by 1950. The City, acting in pursuance of the
amendment, attempted to enjoin the defendant from operating a nonconforming junk yard in a light industrial area. The Supreme Court
of Texas in City of Corpus Christi v. Allen,8 1 held the amendment
unconstitutional reasoning that the use did not present any threat of
harm to the public health, safety or morals, and that the cost of
relocating the junk yard constituted an unconstitutional taking of
property under the state constitution.8 2 This case is often cited as
authority for the proposition that Texas has repudiated the amortization theory.8 3 However, one should not overlook the final sentence
of the opinion, where it was said:
Our conclusion is not to be construed as a holding that the
ordinance in question may not, under other circumstances
be invoked to terminate a non-conforming use, not a nuisance
nor injurious to the public health, morals, safety or welfare. 8 4
In Caruthers v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Bunker Hill
Villages 5 the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas relied on Corpus Christi
and upheld a zoning ordinance establishing minimum building site
area requirements. In dicta, the court left open the constitutionality
of amortization, saying:
We do not wish to be understood as implying that the prior
existence of a non-conforming use is not a factor of great
weight. The fact that most zoning ordinances permit the
continuance of such uses constitutes widespread legislative
recognition, we think, of the importance to be given such a
81. 152 Tex 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953); The fact that the junk yard was
located in a light industrial area may have influenced the Court, and a commentator on this decision has said that its "emphasis is found on the degree of
difference between the use whose termination is sought and the characteristic
use permitted in the neighborhood." Williams, Zoning and Planning Notes, 68
AMER. CrrY 155, 163 (May 1953). A writer commenting on the recent trend of
decisions throughout the United States has predicted that Texas would approve
the amortization theory subject to the test of reasonableness. Note, 7 BAYLOR L.
REV. 73 (1955).
82.

TEX. CONS. art. I, § 17.

83.

42 A.L.R.2d 1146, 1150.
254 S.W.2d 759, 761 (1953).
290 S.W.2d 340 (1956).

84.
85.
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use in balancing private against public equities. Undoubtedly
in many situations a prior existing non-conforming use may
very well constitute the deciding element. But this is still
somewhat short of saying that a prior existing use is in
every case alone and without more to be given controlling
effect. (Emphasis supplied) 86
It has been said that Iowa can also be considered a member of the
camp opposing amortization,8 7 because of the decision of the state
Supreme Court in Stover McCray System v. City of Des Moines.88
The plaintiff in the Des Moines case was an outdoor advertising company that proceeded, by a bill in equity, to enjoin the enforcement of
a local zoning ordinance. An amendment to the ordinance provided
that all free-standing signs were to be removed within a two year
amortization period. The Supreme Court of Iowa enjoined enforcement of the ordinance holding that the plaintiff had a vested property
right in maintaining the signs which could not be arbitrarily interfered with, and that a two year period of amortization constituted a
taking of property without just compensation. But one cannot discount lightly a sentence tacked on to the end of the opinion in which
the court said:
We do not wish to infer herein that under certain circumstances a municipality could not provide for the termination
of non-conforming uses, especially if the period of amortization of the investment was just and reasonable, and the
present use was a source of danger to the public health,
morals, safety or general welfare of those who have come to
be occupants in the surrounding territory.8 9
It should be remembered that neither the Chapman decision in
Ohio nor the Allen case in Texas involved an attack on the constitutionality of an amortization scheme enacted as part of a general
comprehensive zoning ordinance. Rather, both involved amendments
which directed the discontinuance of certain non-conformities within
a relatively short period of time. Courts are understandably suspicious of an ad hoe approach to zoning which, in many cases, grows
out of an attempt to accord special treatment to a favored few, or
reflects the state of political and economic power as of a particular
instance.
86.
87.

290 S.W.2d 340, 346 (1956).
247 Ia. 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956).

88. Mandelker, Prolonging the Non-conforming use: Judicia Restriction o1
the Power to Zone in Iowa, 8 DRAKE L. REV. 23 (1958).
89. 78 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1956).
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There has been a decided trend of decisions favoring the amortization theory, and the appellate courts of New York, Maryland, Washington, Kansas, California, and a federal court sitting in Florida have
upheld its use. In 1958, the Committee on Zoning and Planning in a
report to the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers said:
We predict, as we have heretofore in previous reports, that
the gradual elimination of non-conforming uses by some
amortization plan or program will continue to grow and be
accepted by more and more of our states. 9 0
In Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee,9 1 the defendant had
erected a modern and completely equipped garage and gasoline service

station in 1938. By virtue of a subsequently adopted comprehensive
zoning ordinance both the use and the building became non-conforming. In 1939 an amendment was enacted to the zoning ordinance
requiring that all uses and buildings similar to the plaintiff's be
terminated by January 1, 1949. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit upheld the ordinance finding that it constituted
a reasonable exercise of the police powers of the municipality. The
court relied heavily on the presumed constitutionality of the zoning
ordinance and emphasized that the use was taking place, and the
building located, near the State Capital of Florida. The court showed
little concern over what future use could be made of the service station whose buildings and other equipment, being specialized in nature,
had little adaptability.
The United States Supreme Court has refused to review decisions
where the amortization theory was attacked on constitutional grounds.
It has been predicated, however, 9 2 that review is inevitable, and that
the decision will be as significant as Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
which upheld the constitutionality of zoning ordinances. 93 Some
writers have ventured to predict that the United States Supreme
Court will uphold the constitutionality of amortization:
In view of the fact that a majority of the justices of the
Supreme Court are little concerned with private property
rights, it follows that if and when this type of provision is
presented for their consideration the ordinance will be sus4

tained. 9

90. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ZONING AND PLANNING TO THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS 18 (1958).

91.

183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950).

92.

Babcock, Emerging Legal Issues in Zoning, PLANNING 133 (1954).
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Note, 7 BAYLOR L. REV. 73, 80 (1955).

93.
94.
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One of the landmark cases upholding the constitutionality of amortization is City of Los Angeles v. Gage.9 5 In 1930 defendant Gage constructed a residential structure on one of two contiguous lots legally
using the second floor and half of the first as a private living facility.
The remainder of the first floor faced the street and was used as an
office for a plumbing business. In a garage located to the rear, and on
the adjoining lot, Gage erected storage bins and racks in which he
kept a supply of pipe. Both the structure and the use when commenced
were permitted by the zoning ordinance. Under an ordinance enacted
in 1941, the open storage of materials in the district where the Gage
operation took place was prohibited, but it did recognize the continuation of non-conforming uses. In 1946 Los Angeles enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance changing the area where Gage conducted
his activity to a multiple residential zone, and provided that all nonconforming uses were to be terminated within five years of the effec96
tive date of the ordinance.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid exercise of police power. The
court reasoned that where the landowner is given a specified period of
time during which he may plan to move to a new location, and where
the gain to the public is large when compared to the loss sustained by
the owner, there is no taking that would require compensation. 97
Some light was thrown on the scope of the holding in the Gage case
when City of La Mesa v. Tweed &£Gambrel Planing Mill was decided
two years later.9 8 In La Mesa the defendant's predecessor in title in
1936 erected a planing mill in an area zoned industrial. This same
95. 127 Cal. App.2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
96. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 12.23 (B) (1) (a), which formed
the basis for the Gage litigation, and which is still in existence, reads as follows:
"The non-conforming use of a conforming building or structure may be
continued, except that in the "R" zones any non-conforming commercial
or industrial use of a residential building or residential accessory building
shall be discontinued within five (5) years from June 1, 1946, or five (5)
years from the date the use becomes non-conforming, whichever date is
later."
97. The Gage case has received extensive approval by commentators.
Note, 8 OKL. L. REV. 239 (1955); Note, 6 WEST RES. L. REv. 182 (1955); Note,
53 MICH. L. REV. 762

(1955); Note, 7 STAN. L. REV. 409

(1955); and Note, 30

IND. L. JOUn. 521 (1955). It is interesting to note that after the conclusion of this
case and the refusal of Mr. Gage to terminate his commercial use, a criminal
action was filed against him after which he readily complied and removed his
plumbing business to other land within Los Angeles. This information was contained in a speech delivered by the City Solicitor of Los Angeles, California,
before a meeting of the Southern California Planning Congress held at Anaheim,
California on November 14, 1957.
98. 146 Cal. App. 2d 762, 304 P.2d 803 (1956).
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area was subsequently rezoned residential thus making the mill a nonconforming use of a non-conforming building. The amending ordinance required, in effect, that the mill be eliminated within twenty
years after its initial erection, but in no event could it continue operating more than five years after notice to remove was given. When
notice was given, the mill had twenty-one years of economic life remaining. The City relied on the Gage case, while the defendant argued
that it only applied to a non-conforming use of a conforming structure. The court held that the ordinance, as applied to the facts in the
case before it was unreasonable and discriminatory, because the period
of amortization had no relationship to the value of the non-conforming structure. The Gage case was distinguished on the grounds that
the public gain there, unlike the present case, exceeded the private loss.
Additional light was thrown on the breath of Gage in McCaslin v.
City of Monterey.9 9 There the landowner conducted a mining operation on his land. Two basic ordinances were involved: one provided
for the continuation of non-conforming buildings for a period not in
excess of twenty years from the time of their original construction;
a second ordinance provided for a termination of a non-conforming
use of land within two years after the ordinance was enacted. In 1956,
the second ordinance was amended so as to require the termination
of non-conforming uses of land within sixty days after the effective
date of the enactment.
The amendment was declared unconstitutional by the court on the
basis that it was directed specifically at the landowner, and constituted a taking of property without "due and just compensation." As
a makeweight, the court in substituting its judgment for that of the
legislative branch, went on to say that the mining operation was beneficial to the community since it cleared land for future subdivision.
The court said, in conclusion:
Plaintiff had a vested property right in the use of his property as a quarry of decomposed granite of which he could not
be constitutionally deprived without due process of law. The
legislation in question does not attempt to regulate plaintiff's
operations but prohibits the continuance of the prior nonconforming use altogether. Such legislation can be sustained
under the police power only if it is reasonably related to the
object sought to be accomplished and is not arbitrary and
discriminatory in its application to plaintiff.lo 0
99.
100.

163 Cal. App. 2d 339, 329 P.2d 522 (1958).
163 Cal. App. 2d 339, 345, 329 P.2d 522, 526 (1958).
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There are two additional cases approving the amortization theory
which when considered in detail give some indication of what the
courts will look for in reviewing amortization provisions. Grant v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,10 1 involved an ordinance providing for the removal of outdoor advertising signs from a residential
district within five years of the date on which they become nonconforming. The plaintiff advertising company sought to restrain
enforcement of the ordinance which effected seventy-eight signs with
a gross annual revenue totaling approximately $45,000.00. Witnesses
testified that the signs were unsightly, cause a depreciation of property values, and brought discomfort to the neighborhood. The court,
in an exhaustive opinion, upheld the ordinance as a reasonable exercise of the police powers of the municipality. The court went on to
review in great detail the assumption made by early zoners that nonconformities would gradually disappear. The court concluded that
here was a need for the early elimination of the signs and that reliance
on the law of nuisance and eminent domain was impractical. The
language of the court, however, suggests that the signs did in fact
constitute a nuisance:
In a neighborhood of homes, such commercial intrusions
are offenses to the sight and obnoxious to ordinary, reasonable persons who may own or occupy those homes. Because
of the serious aversion to such signs and billboards, they
substantially and materially annoy and disturb the occupants and interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of their
02
homes.'
The court did recognize a fact peculiar to advertising signs, which
are often placed on steep grades or narrow strips of land, when it
said:
If the ordinance imposed such restrictions that the land
could not be used for any reasonable purpose, it would, of

course, be invalid as to

it.103

New York approved the amortization theory by a process of
judicial evolution. In People v. Miller,' 0 4 the defendant, as a hobby,
kept pigeons in the back yard of his home in a residential area. He
was convicted for violation of a zoning ordinance subsequently enacted which prohibited the keeping of pigeons in the district. The
conviction was affirmed, with the court holding-as did the California
101.
102.

212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
212 Md. 301, 319, 129 A.2d 363, 372 (1957).

103.

212 Md. 301, 320, 129 A.2d 363, 373 (1957).
304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952).

104.
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courts in the case discussed earlier-that a zoning ordinance may
constitutionally require the termination of a non-conforming use if
the loss to the owner is relatively slight and insubstantial as compared to the gain experienced by the public. Further, the court pointed
out, an inconsequential use such as the harboring of pigeons did not
constitute a "vested right" which was considered to be an essential
prerequisite for protecting a non-conforming use. 1O5
Following the Miller decision, the Court of Appeals of New York
in 1958 placed that State in the column approving amortization by its
decision in Harbisonv. City of Buffalo.' 0 6 In 1924 Harbison purchased
a lot abutting on an unpaved street in Buffalo, erected a wooden structure measuring thirty feet by forty feet on the land, and opened a
junk yard. In 1926 the City enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance making the area in which the lot was located residential. An
amendment passed in 1953 provided that the use of land as a junk
yard was to terminate within three years.' 0 7 The City notified Harbison in 1957 that he was to terminate the use, and renewal of his
license to operate the junk yard was refused. The lower court in
mandamus proceedings directed renewal of the license, and the City
appealed relying on the amortization provision of the ordinance.
Four members of the Court of Appeals voted for reversal while
three of the Justices dissented. The majority in reversing and remanding held that a municipality may terminate a non-conforming
use if the owner is permitted to retain the non-conformity for a period
of time sufficiently long to allow the recouping of his investment. Two
members of the majority relied on the Miller decision. The opinion
emphasized that the constitutionality of the ordinance would depend
upon the period allowed for amortization. In remanding the case, the
court directed the trial court to consider the following factors in determining whether the amortization period was reasonable:
105.

After the Miller case, a commentator said that in New York the "size

of the investment is primary criterion" in determining if the non-conformity can
be terminated. Williams, 68 AMER. CITY 155, 163 (May, 1953).
106. 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958).

107.

This amendment, contained in Section 18 of Chapter LXX of the

Ordinances of the City of Buffalo, reads as follows: "§ 18. Non-conforming uses
and buildings. Continuing existing uses: Except as provided in this section, any
non-conforming use of any building, structure, land or premises may be continued.
Provided, however, that on premises situate in any "R" district each use which

is not a conforming use in the "R5" district and which falls into one of the
categories hereinafter enumerated shall cease or shall be changed to a conforming
use within 3 years from the effective date of this amended chapter. The requirements of this subdivision for the termination of non-conforming uses shall apply
in each of the following cases:
... (d) Any junk yard, auto wrecking or dismantling establishment."
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1.

Nature of the surrounding neighborhood;

2.

Value and condition of improvements on the premises;

3.

Cost of and availability of an area to which the use could be
moved. 10 8

The majority made a clear distinction between a non-conforming
use and a non-conforming structure or building, indicating that the
amortization theory was in their opinion an essential tool to planning
in an ever changing community:
To enunciate a contrary rule would mean that the use of
land for such purposes as a tennis court, an open air skating
rink, a junk yard or a parking lot-readily transferable to
another site-at the date of the enactment of the zoning
ordinance vests the owner thereof with the right to utilize
the land in that manner in perpetuity, regardless of changes
in the neighborhood over the course of time.' 09
Though two separate opinions constitute the majority, it can be
said that New York courts have approved the amortization theory,
and this decision has been favorably reviewed by writers and commentators. 1 1 0
Three judges vigorously dissented and painstakingly evaluated the
underlying theory as well as the means of implementing amortization. Initially, they felt that the majority failed to keep separate the
theories of police power and eminent domain. Under the amortization theory, the dissenters said, we are in effect carrying out a redevelopment program which should be predicated on the exercise of
the power of eminent domain. In addition, it was said that no prin108. Upon remand, the lower court held a hearing at which evidence was
taken and the following facts established: There were two wooden buildings and
a shed on the premises, and a permanent concrete pad with a drain and catch
basin. Real estate experts testified that the buildings and other structures were
worth $10,747.00, while the land itself was worth $5,347.00. The only other
suitable site within the general vicinity to which the junk yard could be moved
would cost $32,000.00, and the overall cost of the move to Harbison would be in
excess of $20,000.00. As to the nature of the neighborhood, the court found that
a large mercantile area and storage area for concrete blocks were located within
100 to 300 yards of the junk yard. Based on these facts, the court held the
ordinance as applied unconstitutional. Note, 44 CoR. L. QuAR. 450 (1959). In a
letter, City of Buffalo Corporate Counsel Anthony Manguso indicated that no
appeal would be taken from this determination.
109. 4 N.Y.2d 553, 562, 152 N.E.2d 42, 47 (1958).
110. Note, 44 CORNELL L. Q. 450 (1959); Note, 30 MISS. L. JouR. 210 (1959);
Anderson, Amortization of Non-Conforming Uses - A Preliminary appraisal of
Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 10 SYR. L. REv. 44 (1959); Note 23 ALB. L. REV. 181
(1959); Note, 4 S.D. L. REv. 180 (1959).
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ciple was available for the application of the ordinance, and that the
same amortization period applied to all structures and uses regardless of the nature of their construction or the amount of the investment. With a freedom of expression often available only to dissenters,
they went on to raise a question that deserves consideration by those
interested in the development of new communities, as well as the preservation of existing economic resources in saying:
Moreover, this theory, if it were seriously advanced, would
imply that the owner should not keep up his property by
making necessary replacements to restore against the ravages of time. Such replacements would be money thrown
away. The amortization theory would thus encourage owners of non-conforming uses to allow them to decay and become slums.' 1
In Spurgeon v. Board of Commissioners of Shawnee County,112 the
plaintiff owned and operated a junk yard which constituted a nonconforming use. By virtue of subsequent amendments to the zoning
ordinance, it was to be terminated within two years. The Supreme
Court of Kansas held that requiring the discontinuance of a nonconforming use within two years, based on the facts, was not an unreasonable exercise of the police powers. The court, sub silento, reversed a decision rendered in 1935 which purported to give perpetual
3
protection to all non-conformities. 11
The most recent decision involving amortization in the appellate
courts is City of Seattle v. Martin.1 4 The defendant Martin, had occupied the land for nine years, on a month to month tenancy, as a
repair site for construction vehicles before it was zoned residential.
The defendant was given one year in which to terminate his use. The
Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the defendant's conviction
for violation of the ordinance reaffirming the principle that the constitutionality of amortization ordinances would rest on whether the
significance of the hardship to the landowner is more compelling, or
whether it is reasonably overbalanced by the benefit which the public would realize by termination. The court found that defendant
realized no substantial hardship from enforcement of the ordinance
because no structures were involved, the tenancy was on a month to
month basis, and the junk yard could have been readily relocated. The
111.
112.
113.
114.

4 N.Y.2d 553, 575 152 N.E.2d 42, 54 (1958).
181 Kan. 1008, 317 p.2d 798 (1957).
City of Norton v. Huston, 142 Kan. 305, 46 p.2d 630 (1935).
54 Wash. 2d 663, 342 p.2d 602 (1959).
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court said: "Appellant is not being required to tear down a building
or liquidate a large business." 15
The Seattle ordinance involved in the Martin case limited application of the amortization theory to uses not taking place in a building.
Such limitation suggests that the ordinance was motivated by
aesthetic considerations. It would be difficult to imagine that a use
would become any less or more compatible if it takes place in or outside a building. Noise may be reduced, but smoke and other obnoxious by-products will be present together with a need for parking
and other public facilities. In challenging this difference in treatment,
counsel for Mr. Martin in his brief in the Supreme Court of Washington said:
A watchmaker in a $400.00 building could continue. A used
car lot or a parking lot with no office would have to stop.
If they had a $100.00 office building perhaps they could continue. Such distinctions are not reasonable. i 16
With the exception of the Grant and the Standard Oil Co. cases the
litigation involved non-conforming uses with relatively little or no
investment in structures or buildings.
EVALUATION OF THE THEORY AND
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
The regulation and control of land use in America has become a
matter of increasing concern to every individual even remotely aware
of "urban sprawl". The problems facing professional planners, public officials, and civic groups who are attempting to correct the deleterious results of unguided, and perhaps at times reckless,
urban growth are complex and many. Those individuals even remotely
associated with the problems gripping our cities realize that the
counterattack will involve many tools and techniques: comprehensive planning, urban renewal and redevelopment, zoning and land
use control, training of a hard core of professional planners and ad115.

54 Wash. 2d 663, 666, 342 p.2d 602, 604 (1959).

116.

Brief for Appellant, p. 10, City of Seattle v. Martin, 154 Wash.2d 541,

342 p.2d 602 (1959). The Martin case Is criticized in Note, 35 WASH. L. REv. 213

(1959), where the author states:
"In the Martin Case it (Washington Supreme Court) allows a taking of
rights-if not property in the strict sense, at least a use of propertywhere no compensation is made. Whatever be the policy result desired,
would it not be better that our court clearly articulate its policy reasoning and at least compensate a property owner for a taking of his rights."
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ministrators, and, most significantly, an aware, sympathetic, and receptive citizenry.
The elimination of non-conformities is one aspect of this total
effort, and the importance of elimination varies with both the nature
of the community and the particular non-conformity. The need to
eliminate non-conformities has at times been viewed with urgency.
An early advocate of the amortization theory said:
Professional planners and city officials now recognize ....
that the fundamental problem facing zoning is the inability
7
to eliminate the non-conforming use.' 1
Whether elimination deserves such priority is doubtful, and there
is certainly reason for believing that too much reliance is being
placed on elimination merely for the sake of elimination.
There are three reasons commonly advanced to support adoption
of ordinances embodying amortization provisions:
1. A non-conformity, during the period when it enjoys such
status, is in a monopolistic position which should generate extraordinary returns to compensate any losses possibly sustained by virtue
of elimination; "Is
2. During the amortization period, the original investment in the
non-conformity may be recouped, and the owner can make plans for
relocating the non-conformity; " 1 9
3. Where a non-conforming use of land not involving a building
or structure must be terminated, the detriment suffered by the owner
20
will in most cases be small and the gain to the public substantial.'
A.

Effectiveness of Amortization as a Tool of Planning:

1. Period of Amortization: Professional planners and public officials frequently assume that a non-conformity must be eliminated at
the earliest possible date. Where a non-conforming use of land is involved, the period provided for amortization is relatively short and
ranges from one to three years. However, elimination of nonconforming structures is ordinarily provided for over a period ranging from ten to fifty years and in certain instances to the "usable
117.
118.

Note, 9 U. Cm L. REV. 477, 479 (1942).
102 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 94 (1953).

119. Mandelker, op. cit. note 83, at 23.
120. Note, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 295, 297 (1955); People v. Miller, 304 N.Y.
105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1953), gave judicial approval to this approach. It is developed
in greater detail by Crolly, How to Get Bid o! Non-conforming Uses, 68 AMi.
CITY 106 (November, 1952).
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life of the building". There is a genuine basis for questioning the
effectiveness of the theory where such long periods for elimination
are contemplated. One planner has observed that amortization is
ineffective where the elimination period exceeds ten years. A long
amortization period suggests that the harmful impact of the nonconformity is more fictional than real. 1 21 In questioning amortization schemes requiring the passage of several decades before a nonconformity can be eliminated, another writer said:
Unfortunately, the normal period for amortization is so long
that the real determination is left to succeeding generations
unless the owner voluntarily abandons his business. When
amortization is fixed for a period of 10 to 20 years, we are
not resolving the problem; we are avoiding it.122
Long amortization periods may bring on a solidification of the
future growth of the community and results in a static, self-satisfied
planning situation. To some extent it is arbitrary soothsaying for
anyone to contend that at a point twenty years or thirty years hence,
any particular structure or building should be eliminated.
2. Economics of Amortization: There is reason for being concerned about the economic waste that may result from compliance
with the amortization provisions of a zoning ordinance. The answer,
equally speculative, is a general belief that effective planning should,
over the long term, benefit the entire community. There is present
the hidden fear that a building subject to amortization will become
vacant long in advance of the established termination date. A tenant
may be reluctant to lease such a structure, even for a short period of
time, if an adequate supply of conforming buildings exist in another
part of the community. A vacated structure quickly becomes a hazard to the community and often tends to aggravate an already deteriorating area. In addition, the owner of a non-conforming building, scheduled for elimination because of an amortization provision,
would be naturally reluctant to undertake necessary expenditures 2 3 to improve and maintain the structure.
However, there is no reason to think that a municipality could not
protect itself by code enforcement or reliance on the law of nuisance.
This may actually be a means of accelerating the termination date
121. Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20 LAW &
CON.PROB. 305 (1955).
122. Horack, Emerging Legal Issues in Zoning, PLANNING 132, 151 (1954).
123. The three dissenting Judges in Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y. 2d

553, 571, 152 N.E.2d 42, 54 (1958) expressed concern for such a possibility.
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inasmuch as the law of nuisance is an effective means for abolishing
12 4
a non-conformity without compensation.
3. Administration: It is an elementary principle of municipal
government that the effectiveness of a zoning ordinance can be
easily neutralized unless capable personnel are recruited to administer it through a well organized department within the local government. Amortization provisions, especially those proposed in recent
years, are complex and require continuous oversight by the administrator.
Many large cities have professionally trained employees in departments assigned the responsibility for enforcing zoning ordinances.
They are insulated from a host of formal and informal pressures
that tend to impede and at times subtly coerce officials in the smaller
units of government. Amortization ordinances will require a high degree of expertise on the part of the zoning staff. Non-conformities
must be identified, observed, and definite termination dates established and enforced. It is this latter responsibility that will probably
prove to be the pitfall for amortization in certain municipalities.
There is a certain repugnance to requiring a use which is not a nuisance to be terminated or a building which does not pose an obvious
or clear threat to the public health and safety to be removed.
Writers have pessimistically viewed effective enforcement of amortization provisions. One has warned:
The greatest danger is that amortization provisions will become 'dead letters'. The difficulties of enforcement, particularly in smaller cities, make it unlikely that many nonconforming uses will be enjoined at the end of the amortiza5
tion period. 12
Such fears are not in themselves a ground for rejecting the earliest
possible termination of non-conformities. Yet, it is always a matter
of concern that those charged with the responsibility of enforcing
any law are reluctant to discharge their responsibility. One possible
inference is that such officials feel the law to be unjustly harsh, or
they lack belief in its usefulness and necessity.
B. Legality and Reality
1. Amortization-Definition: Only ten years ago the zoning panel
of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers expressed strong
124.

Note, 23 ALBANY L. REv. 181 (1959).

125.

HORACK & VAL NOLAN, LAND USE CONTROLS at 162-163

ing Co. 1955).

(West Publish-
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doubt as to the constitutionality of amortization. One of the more
distinguished members of the panel when asked for his opinion said:
Mr. Yokley: I am frank to state, Sir, on the basis of the decisions I have read I do not believe your provisions in your
ordinance could be sustained, unless there was specific statutory authorization for that specific type of thing, and even
then I think that the statute would be questionable. 1 2 6
Now, however, the trend of decisions is clearly in favor of approving
the amortization theory as a tool necessary for orderly community
development. There is little, if any, sustained and organized opposition to it. There was never any really effective and determined
effort by the propertied interests to counter amortization.
The essence of the amortization theory, so far as the question of
constitutionality is concerned, is as follows:
one can maintain a non-conforming use, building, or structure until
such time as the non-conformity no longer has economic value. The
period is calculated by measuring the time required for depreciating
such an item as a cost of doing business, thereby permitting the
owner to recoup his investment. This is the accountant's treatment of
depreciation and is computed in terms of investment in the property,
and not in terms of useful life or the ability to generate economic gain.
Use of the word amortization in zoning ordinance is inaccurate, for
it has been defined as follows:
In its modern sense, amortization is the operation of paying
off bonds, stock, a mortgage, or other indebtedness, commonly of a state or corporation, by installments, or by a
7
sinking fund. 12
From this definition it can be seen that it would be more accurate to
use the word "depreciation". It has been recommended that the word
"liquidate" be used as a substitute for amortization. 1 28
The amortization theory is in essence synonymous with the term
"theoretical depreciation" which is defined as follows:
126.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS, MUNICIPALITIES AND

THE LAW IN ACTION 163 (1950). Seven years later the National Institute of
Municipal Law Officers dispelled all doubt and said: "The policy of the law is the
gradual elimination of non-conforming uses... and amortization is a reasonable
exercise of police powers." RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW § 32-33 (1957). The amortization theory is now generally included in the compilations of model zoning
ordinance provisions that are utilized by local units of government in preparing
their enactments. MATrHEWS,DRAFTING MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES § 5.46 (Callayhan
and Co. 1956).
127. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 108 (4th ed. 1951).
128. Note, 6 WEST RES. L. REv. 182 (1955).
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Theoretical Depreciationis the amount of depreciation calculated for a property by the mechanical application of some
theoretical method. Accountants, without expert knowledge
of either the property or the service characteristics of its
units, often determine theoretical depreciation by using average life tables. In so doing their object is not one of valua1 29
tion but one of amortizing a prepaid expense.
Theoretical depreciation does not necessarily include the useful life
inherent in the asset, but is similar to that adopted by the Internal
Revenue Service. 1 3 0 Amortization or theoretical depreciation when
applied to any particular non-conformity, therefore, does not allow
for the fact that, at the end of the amortization or depreciation period
the non-conformity may still have a useful life or the capacity to generate economic gain.
A term more realistically reflecting the actual economic situation
at the end of the amortization period is "Actual Depreciation" which
has been defined as follows:
Actual Depreciation is the true loss of value of property
units during service as contrasted with depreciation calculated by some assumed rate at which the property units lose
value with increase of age. Actual depreciation can be determined correctly only by competent engineering valuation
experts, who personally examine the property and who form
sound judgments of their depreciation by applying correctly
the principles of depreciation losses of value after careful
consideration of the facts bearing on depreciation in each
particularcase.' 31 (Emphasis supplied)
Amortization provisions in zoning ordinances usually do not contain the flexibility to allow for the individualized treatment of proptery that actual depreciation requires. The ordinances for the most
part provide the same amortization period for all property of a certain general nature in broad inclusive categories. The theory assumes
that at the end of the amortization period the property has no remaining economic life or value. Yet, it is quite conceivable that a building
or structure, though totally depreciated so far as the accountants and
129. Wenfrey, Depreciation of Group Properties, 41 IOWA
EXPERIMENTATION STATION BULIzIN #115 No. 1, at 11 (1942).

ENGINEERNG

130. Int. Rev. Code of 1954. § 1167(b); Int. Rev. Code Reg. § 1.167(b).
131. Wenfrey, op. cit. supra Note 129, at 11. For a relatively brief discussion of the underlying theory of depreciation as used by the Internal Revenue
Service, and its persistent shift reflecting national economic policy, see Terborgh,
Realistic Depreciation Pollcy, MACHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE at
48-58 (1954).
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tax officials are concerned, may have economic value and still be
capable of producing income. Although the practical affects of the
theoretical approach to amortization has not been of concern to the
courts or commentators, it is difficult to deny that an economic value
or income potential may still be present in the non-conformity even
though the amortization period provided for in the ordinance has
expired.
The amortization period often bears no relationship to the nature
of the non-conformity. It has been said that the common meaning
of the word amortization has become so distorted as to be meaningless,
13
and is little more than an "empty catch phrase". 2
2. Exclusion of Non-Conformities from Entire Municipality: In
approving the amortization theory, the courts have found comfort in
the fact that the owner could relocate. The court in City of Los
Angeles v. Gage, for example, said:
The ordinance does not prevent the operation of defendants'
business; it merely restricts its location. Discontinuance of
the non-conforming use requires only that Gage move his
plumbing business to property that is zoned for it. 133
None of the cases reviewed approving the amortization theory
involved a total restriction against a relocation of the non-conformity
anywhere within the municipality. Though some doubt has been expressed as to the constitutionality of a provision totally excluding a
non-conformity from a municipality thereby preventing relocation, at
least one observer predicts that such a provision would be approved
by the courts.13 4 It is difficult, however, to generalize on this matter
without taking the following factors into consideration:
a. Size and character of the municipality;
b. Ability to relocate and operate the non-conformity in another
municipality in the area;
c. Nature and incompatability of the particular non-conformity.
From a consideration of these factors the court might determine that
in a particular case, total exclusion, or prohibition against relocation,
is a reasonable exercise of the police power and, therefore, constitutional.
3. No Other Available Use Remaining: Situations can be imagined
where no other use, structure or building could be economically commenced or erected except one that constitutes a non-conformity. In
132.
133.

Note, 23 ALBANY L. REv. 181 (1959).
127 Cal. App.2d 442, 447, 274 p.2d 34, 44 (1954).

134.

MESSER,

ACTION 374 (1951).
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Grant v. Mayor and City Council, the Maryland Court of Appeals
after approving an ordinance compelling the elimination of billboards
said:
If the ordinance imposed such restrictions that the land could
not be used for any reasonable purpose, it would, of course,
be invalid as to it. 135
C. Proposed Alternatives; Performance Standards: One of the
more obvious disadvantages to the amortization theory is that it
eliminates a going enterprise that may in fact be providing a necessary
service and employing individuals that may not be readily re-employed. There is the case of a small non-conforming grocery store
serving a residential area. Though perhaps by day it may suggest a
disharmonious land use, by night it provides help to the housewife
who suddenly becomes aware that she has a short supply of bread or
milk. Such an activity may be both desirable and necessary within an
area. But such a sympathetic approach cannot ignore the fact that
this same grocery store may contribute to parking problems, have
lights that glare into adjoining homes, be unsightly, and provide a
haven for nocturnal meetings of neighborhood juveniles. 136 The same
ambivalent position could be taken about a light industrial plant or
a warehouse constituting a non-conformity.
One of the solutions recommended, as a means of escaping from the
horns of the dilemma posed, is the adoption of performance standards.13 7 Under this approach, again returning to the corner grocery,
the municipality would require off-street parking facilities, a redesigned front, and other useful adaptations. There is no genuine disagreement as to what type of modifications might be necessary in
order to make a grocery store a compatible use in a residential area.
129 A.2d 363, 373 (1957). MESSER, in NON-CONFORMING USES, MUNICI374 (1951) said the following:
"Of course, there might be instances in which the property the use of
which is sought to be discontinued cannot be adopted to any use permitted under the provisions of the ordinance relating to the particular
district, and in such cases undoubtedly the court would hold the discontinuance provision to be unreasonable as applied to particular property."
136. Horack, Emerging Legal Issues In Zoning, PLANNING 151 (1954).
135.

PALITIES AND THE LAW IN ACTION

137. Horack, Performance Standards in Zoning, PLANNING 153 (1952);
Anderson, Amortization of Non-Conforming Uses-A Preliminary Appraisal of
Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 10 SYR. L. REv. 44 (1959); There has been no appreciable movement towards adopting this alternative to amortization. None of the
twenty-five cities surveyed adopted this approach. W. SPANGLER, in MODEL ZONING ORDINANCES (1960), suggests a model amortization scheme for Stanislaus
County, California, whereby all non-conforming uses would be involuntarily
terminated unless altered so as to be in conformity with strict performance
standards.
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From the corner grocery store, by a series of graduations, we move
to the light industrial facility where the problems of establishing and
administering performance standards become more difficult. There is
1 38
a substantial area of disagreement over such standards.
Performance standards imply enforcement and governmental oversight that may impose a substantial burden on local officials. To some
extent this burden may be lightened by a co-operative citizenry alert
to any violations. Great advances have been made in the technological phases of all human endeavor. It is difficult to believe that many
of the obnoxious, and at times intolerable, side effects of certain activities cannot be completely negated by performance standards.
Great emphasis has been placed on the adoption of performance standards even by those that helped formulate the amortization theory. It
was early said that constitutionality of the amortization theory should
be considered in light of the feasibility of adopting performance standards.

13 9

D. Establishment and Administration of Flexible Amortization:
Most ordinances containing an amortization provision contain a fixed
period within which the non-conformity is to terminate. Early ordinances provided nearly uniform periods of amortization while the
more sophisticated enactments and proposals of the present decade
give consideration to the value, nature of construction, and incompatibility of the non-conformity. Yet none of these ordinances or
proposals allow for sufficient flexibility to individualize the amortization period for every particular non-conformity. Few of them allow
any discretion to local administrators.
If a flexible procedure is established, it will be necessary for the
administration first to identify and establish the value of the nonconformity, and secondly, to prescribe the period within which the
non-conformity must terminate. Identification is essentially ministerial and should be completed with little difficulty. The valuation phase
of the first step will present greater difficulty. It has been recommended that the valuation be established on the basis of the assessment rolls used for purposes of taxation. 14 0 This approach is questionable inasmuch as local tax assessment rarely reflects the actual
value of the property. In a number of municipalities there is a
deliberate design on the part of a local taxing body to systematically
138. Williams, Implications of the FirankZin Institute Study for Planning
and Zoning, 18 JR. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 181 (1952).

139. Noll, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisance, 41 COL. L. REV. 457 (1941).
140. BUREAU OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED PLANNING CODE § 523. (This

publication is undated, and is available in the Library of the Graduate School of
Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh).
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keep real estate assessments at a percentage well below the actual
value of the property.141 A more accurate approach would be to require a determination of the value of each non-conformity and then
to post it in a public office.
Though valuation itself may prove difficult enough, the problems
inherent in determining the amortization period once value is established would be even more challenging. The first and uniquely difficult
problem would be to determine the amount of discretion that should
be vested in the local administrators fixing the period.
It has been recommended that the local official be permitted to exercise his discretion between established maximum and minimum
periods.14 2 This would restrict the discretion of the official and allow
for tolerable limits within which social and economic forces could
move. Another proposal would grant the same local official discretion
to fix the amortization period in each particular case based on the
facts peculiar to the particular non-conformity in question. This
immediately raises the never to be neglected fear of arbitrariness.
There may well be some basis for such fear, and the eventual solution
may be the establishment of a quasi-judicial body in the municipality
to fix amortization periods for non-conformities. In the absence of a
grant of discretion, however, it is difficult to imagine how the amortization period can in fact be tailored to coincide with the inherent
economic life of the particular non-conformity.
CONCLUSION
There is a clear, though as yet not decisive, movement to approve
reasonable legislation requiring the elimination of all non-conformities. The courts are slowly, but persistently, upholding amortization
provisions in comprehensive zoning ordinances.
How useful the amortization approach will be to thorough, sound
community planning and development is far from certain. The amortization theory can be successfully applied to the elimination of nonstructural non-conforming uses. The number of such uses existing in
many municipalities is large, and their overall impact on the health,
safety, and welfare of the population cannot be ignored.
The success and usefulness of the amortization theory will first be
seriously challenged when it comes into conflict with non-conformities
involving substantial capital investments. That point has not yet
arrived. How significant amortization will be in making large scale
141.

MCDONALD, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION at 438,

444 (Crowell Co. 1951).
142. Note, 30 IND. L. J. 521 (1955).
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contributions to the future development of our communities should
be carefully evaluated. This is not to imply that amortization be
ignored or abandoned, but rather to suggest that it be placed in a
perspective that will not cause planners to rely on it to the detriment
of other, possibly more effective, tools.
From an examination of the judicial decisions dealing with amortization provisions, and various authorities that have advocated and
resisted its adoption, it becomes evident that planners have not precisely articulated what they anticipate the theory can and should
accomplish.
One detects at times a spirit of elimination for the sake of elimination. Perhaps such enthusiasm can be attributed to the long and at
times imponderable obstacles that planners and public officials met
in the past when they attempted to eliminate non-conformities.
Planners have not yet sufficiently developed and expounded a sound
and systematic philosophy to support the adoption of the amortization
theory as a necessary tool for community planning and development.
There is a danger that amortization provisions will be constructed
and administered so as to treat all non-conformities in a stereotyped
routine manner, and that little effort will be expended towards discovering and understanding the total environment in which a particular non-conformity exists. In this regard, emphasis should shift
to determining the compatability of particular non-conformities, and
the subsequent elmination of those that are considered to be incompatible and deleterious to the community. This will, of course, require
a value judgment in an area where there is little agreement on abso1 43
lutes and basic premises.
Until such time as the scope and purpose of the amortization theory
are succinctly formulated, it will be difficult for the lawyer to draft
amortization provisions meant to do more than merely receive judicial
approval. No frame of reference or point of departure has been forthcoming upon which the property owners, lawyers, and planners together with municipal officials can base their action. 14 4
There is a natural tendency after completing any research in an
area of the law that is rapidly changing and undergoing significant
developments, to synthesize a host of facts and relatively insignificant
discoveries into something tangible that anticipates what the law will
be in the near future. The temptation to prepare a detailed amortization scheme is great, but the need for restraint is compelling and
143. O'Harrow Dilemma of the non-conforming use, ASPO Newsletter, Vol.
22, No. 1, Jan., 1956.
144.

Babcock, Emerging Legal Issues in Zoning, PLANNING 132-138 (1954).
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clear. ' 4 5 From an analysis of the judicial decisions and writings dealing with amortization one can find a few general guide lines that
could form the point of departure for drafting an amortization provision in a zoning ordinance. From among these, the following should
be considered:
1. The courts are more receptive to an amortization provision
where it is enacted as a part of a general comprehensive zoning ordinance and is not a one-time attempt to eliminate certain undesirable
non-conformities;
2. The following distinctions should be kept in mind:
a. A non-conforming use of a conforming structure or building;
b. A conforming use of a non-conforming structure or building;
c. A non-conforming use of land not involving a structure or
building; and
d. A non-conforming use of a non-conforming structure or
building.
3. The plan should provide different amortization periods for each
of the categories in 2. above, taking into consideration the size of any
non-conforming building or structure, especially the cost of construction, as well as the nature of the construction;
4. The amortization scheme should be flexible and permit certain
types of non-conformities, not otherwise incompatible with an overall
community plan, to continue indefinitely, after a finding by a quasijudicial body that specific pre-established conditions exist;
a. The existence of an extraordinary economic hardship; or
b. The community need for, or desiribility of, continuing the
non-conformity in any particular situation regardless of
economic hardship;
5. There should be provision, finally, for the establishment of a
new unit, or utilization of an otherwise adequate and existing unit,
within the local government, staffed with professional personnel to
administer and provide oversight for any amortization scheme.
145. The reasons for this reluctance to be more concrete was succinctly
stated by the AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, in TEXT OF A MODEL
ZONING ORDINANCE (2d ed., 1960) where at p. 35 the following was said:
"The writers did not choose to include provisions in the model text setting
up base period schedules. There is, to begin with, a serious question as to
whether any given community will want to resort to what a substantial
element of the area will view as a 'radical' measure. There is, further,
no general agreement yet as to what constitutes 'proper' amortization
bases. The appellate court cases are not yet sufficiently numerous to
work a rationale. Examination of zoning ordinances including this feature disclose a wide variation of judgment as to what is reasonable."

